Matthew Frise is a philosophy PhD student at the University of Rochester. His research centers on epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion, and has appeared in Synthese and Religious Studies.
In his dissertation he draws heavily on research in the cognitive psychology of memory in an effort to undermine externalism about epistemic justification and to defend an internalist form of evidentialism.
My project investigates the relationship between metacognition and intellectual humility. Metacognition is the internal monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I will argue that research on metacognition strongly suggests that the virtue of intellectual humility is widespread among humans. I will argue that although metacognition is a heuristic-based dual-process, the role it plays in the forming and retaining of our doxastic attitudes does not result in significant epistemic irrationality. Rather, on many theories of epistemic justification, it is likely that via metacognition we in general manage our doxastic attitudes rationally. And, although cognitive psychology appears to suggest that our reliance on a heuristic-based dual-process like metacognition makes us intellectually defective in ways, I will argue that it is not required for intellectual humility that we eliminate these apparent defects. Metacognition is in fact sensitive to these apparent defects in a way that helps us achieve intellectual humility.